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SUMMARY
This article provides a 20 year overview of children’s rights jurisprudence
in South Africa, with a predominant focus on cases in the public law arena
(as opposed to family law). After identifying various themes that the author
believes are worthy of note, such as the interplay between best interests
and the child’s rights to dignity; the innovative remedies that have
characterised child rights case outcomes; and the courts’ engagement with
international law, the article concludes that constitutionalising children’s
rights has the advantage of elevating their status to the highest point in a
legal system. Moreover, rights having the capacity to shift the balance of
power, and for children, the framing of their rights in constitutional terms
has resoundingly dislodged paternalistic approaches rooted in welfarism.
1 Introduction
This retrospective builds on a number of previous endeavours to give life
to the significant jurisprudence that has developed in 20 years of
children’s rights litigation in South Africa. This article will provide a
synopsis of previous efforts to unpack the overarching contribution of
children’s rights litigation over somewhat more than two decades, with
a few brief updates of more recent cases. Thereafter, the article will
engage with specific themes that emerge from the case law. A
summative assessment of the contribution of children’s rights litigation
to the constitutional project of embedding children’s right ideals in
practice forms the conclusion.
2 Overview of previous endeavours
Articles in 2002, 2008 and 2013 appear to have laid a basis for the
systemic consideration of South African children’s rights jurisprudence in
aggregate. The 2002 publication1 was undertaken in an effort to explore
whether the generous predictions of an earlier article on the supposed
impact that the constitutionalisation of children rights was going to have,
had in fact born fruit. The findings of that analysis were that the initial
1 Sloth-Nielsen “Children’s rights in the South African courts: An overview
since ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” 2002
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constitutional promise had not been met. It was asserted that children’s
constitutional rights had largely been harnessed by adults in pursuit of
their own claims, and that children’s individual interests had not taken
centre stage. Children had been all but invisible in constitutional litigation
at that point, prompting Justice Albie Sachs in an oft quoted postscript to
lament that that the Constitutional Court (hereafter CC) was not even
appraised of the views of the scholars whose parents were seeking a
confirmation of their parental rights to permit the practice of corporal
punishment in private schools.2 This period also saw the disappointing
outcome for children’s rights advocacy heralded by the then major socio-
economic rights case, Government of the Republic of South Africa and
others v Grootboom and others.3 The CC declined to interpret the child’s
rights to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care and social services in
section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution to encompass a directly enforceable
claim for a minimum level of shelter against the state for destitute
children, unless such children were orphaned, abandoned or otherwise
lacked a family environment. The decision thereby evidently closed the
door to a more expansive reading which would see children have a
preferential claim to resources, as some academics had suggested was
the true meaning of section 28(1)(c).4
The 2008 article, published in the same journal, was geared towards
an international audience potentially following the desirability of
justiciable and constitutionally enshrined legal rights for children as an
avenue for the enhanced domestication of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).5 This article6 adopted the
framework of the four cardinal pillars of the CRC – non-discrimination,
best interests, the right to life, survival and development, and freedom to
express views and have those views taken into account – and attempted
to classify an increasing array of case law concerning children’s rights
into one of those headings. The article indicated that the pendulum had
indeed swung towards an identification of children’s interests eo nomine.
2 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 10 BCLR 1051
(CC).
3 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
4 Creamer “The implication of socio-economic rights jurisprudence for
government planning and budgeting: the case of children's socio-economic
rights” 2004 Law, Democracy and Development 221.
5 UNICEF Innocenti Centre “Law reform and the implementation of
Convention on the Rights of the Child” 2008 available at https://www.unicef
-irc.org/publications/493-law-reform-and-the-implementation-of-the-conven
tion-on-the-rights-of-the-child.html; see for examples of the international
interest in the South African experience of constitutionalising children’s
rights, Tobin “Increasingly seen and heard: the constitutional recognition of
children’s rights” 2005 SAJHR 86 and O’Mahony “The promises and pitfalls
of constitutionalising children’s rights” 2019 Human Rights Law Review (in
press).
6 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur “2+2=5? Exploring the Domestication of the
CRC in South African Jurisprudence (2002-2006)” 2008 IJCR 1.
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Cited examples of cases during that era illustrating this point were Centre
for Child Law v Minister for Home Affairs7 (concerning the interests of
migrant children in detention), AD v DW8 (whether “nude” guardianship
orders could be granted to subvert the intercountry adoption process), De
Reuck v DPP9 (upholding the ban on possession of child pornography in
children’s best interests), and Brandt v S10 (juvenile sentencing and the
restrictive use of deprivation of liberty). The conclusions were reached
that children’s interests had featured prominently in litigation during that
period, with their views being taken into account, legal representation for
them being raised by judges mero motu, and curators appointed to
oversee their interests in legal proceedings. Furthermore a notable
increase in public interest litigation had surfaced, in cases such as
Khosa11 (forcing the payment of social grants to children of permanent
residents) and Treatment Action Campaign12 (declaring the limitations on
the public health sites at which the anti retroviral drugs would be
available to mothers giving birth unconstitutional). Children’s rights had
been employed both as a sword (including an order compelling the
provision of adequate sleeping facilities for children in alternative care in
the so called Luckhoff case brought by the Centre for Child Law on behalf
of the school with that name,13 for instance) and as a shield (for example,
in De Reuck to resist a claim that the offender’s right to privacy and
freedom of expression were violated via the legislative ban relating to
child pornography). Further, customary law had been shaken to the core
in the Bhe case,14 which overruled the foundational system of male
primogeniture in inheritance. The reasons advanced at the time for the
upswell in children’s litigation remain valid: we averred that “substantial
credit must go to public interest litigators, such as the Womens’ Legal
Centre (who took the Bhe case to the CC), and the Centre for Child Law,
established during the period covered by that review, for bringing
children’s interests to the fore in judicial proceedings.”15 We suggested
that there was no reason to believe that the impact of public interest
litigation in this sphere was going to decline or dissipate and hence, that
“the further development of a coherent and rights-based child
jurisprudence seems promising.”16 As the title of the article suggested, it
was argued that the impact of children’s rights litigation in constitutional
jurisprudence was already, by then, more than the sum of its parts.
7 2005 6 SA 50 (T).
8 2008 3 SA 183 (CC).
9 2004 1 SA 406 (CC).
10 2004 JOL 1322 (SCA).
11 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC).
12 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC).
13 Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T).
14 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2004 2 SA 544 (C).
15 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur 2008 IJCR 27.
16 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur 2008 IJCR 27.
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In 2013, a follow up was penned by myself and Helen Kruuse.17 The
article highlighted eight areas of distinction in this five-year period. These
included: judicial approval of resource mobilisation for the fulfilment of
children’s rights,18 emphasis on the quality of and standards in
education;19 the development of innovative remedies to deal with
unreasonable state measures affecting children;20 and an increasing
focus on the right to dignity of the child.21
The authors concluded that the scope of the cases cited pointed to the
growing insertion of children’s rights considerations in increasingly
diverse areas of legal interaction. Furthermore, the authors posited that
the CRC and ACRWC – together with non-binding sources of
international law – had substantively informed and enriched the
jurisprudence of South African courts, such that it was claimed that South
Africa may have crossed an invisible line from being a dualist to a monist
state regarding the incorporation of international law in so far as
children’s rights were concerned. Finally, it was suggested that South
African courts had begun to construct an image of the “constitutional
child”. It was asserted that a starting point must be the now famous
dictum of Sachs J in S v M:22 
“Every child has his or her own dignity. If a child is to be constitutionally
imagined as an individual with a distinctive personality, and not merely as a
miniature adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a
mere extension of his or her parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim
with them”.23
Elaborating this vision, Justice Sachs continued in a less often quoted
vein: 
“Individually and collectively all children have the right to express themselves
as independent social beings, to have their own laughter as well as sorrow, to
play, imagine and explore in their own way, to themselves get to understand
their bodies, minds and emotions, and above all to learn as they grow how
they should conduct themselves and make choices in the wide social and
moral world of adulthood. And foundational to the enjoyment of the right to
17 Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse “A maturing manifesto: The Constitutionalisation
of Children’s Rights in South African Jurisprudence 2007-2012” 2013 IJCR
646.
18 NAWONGO v MEC of Social Development, Free State 2010 ZAFSHC 73; 2011
ZAFSHC 84; Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of
the Republic of South Africa 2011 5 SA 87 (WCC).
19 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 8 BCLR 761
(CC); Centre for Child Law v Minister of Basic Education 2012 ZAECGHC 60;
Section 27 v Minister of Education 2012 ZAGPPHC 114.
20 DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2
SACR 77 (CC); Jonker v The Manager, Gali Thembani/JJ Serfontein School 2012
ZAECGHC 12.
21 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). See too C
v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 ZACC 1 and M
v Johncom Media Ltd; 2009 4 SA 7 (CC).
22 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) supra.
23 Para 18.
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childhood is the promotion of the rights as far as possible to live in a secure
and nurturing environment free from violence, fear, want and avoidable
trauma.”24 
The picture of constitutional childhood, the authors said had been
painted, was one of protection coupled with emancipation, of freedom to
explore, blended with adult guidance and compass.25
3 Other significant more recent overviews
Skelton’s new chapter in Child Law in South Africa26 provides a
comprehensive analysis of the constitutional protection of children’s
human rights. She explains at length the role of amici curiae in children’s
rights litigation, citing a string of cases, especially post 2008, in which the
amicus briefs played a substantial role.27 She illustrates the nascent but
significant dynamic of children’s direct involvement in litigation, citing
amongst others Centre for Child Law v Hoërskool Fochville28 in which a
group of children were represented collectively by the Centre, and had
their expressed views and interests taken into account by way of
questionnaires that they had completed. Two noteworthy (and child
rights compliant) features of the skirmish included that the right to
represent the children’s views was accepted in the face of a claim that
their interests could be perfectly adequately put forward by their parents,
since these had been cited as respondents in the case; and that the
children’s privacy and anonymity would be preserved through denying
the applicants direct access to the individual questionnaires. 
Skelton’s chapter expounds on the array of remedies that have been
fashioned in constitutional litigation concerning children, including
orders of invalidity resulting in severance of offending provisions, orders
of invalidity resulting in a “reading in”, orders of invalidity resulting in the
requirement of amending legislation,29 structural interdicts or
supervisory orders, and damages awards, such as in MR v Minister of
Safety and Security30 where the child successfully sued for wrongful
arrest and detention.31 
Understandably, and somewhat concealed in the analysis, are the
gains for children’s rights brought about by settlements and agreements:
24 Para 19.
25 Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 2013 IJCR 671.
26 Skelton “Chapter 11: Constitutional protection of Children’s Rights” in
Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa 2017.
27 Skelton “Chapter 11: Constitutional protection of Children’s Rights” 334.
28 2016 2 SA 121 (SCA).
29 Notably after Teddy Bear Clinic v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development 2014 2 SA 208 (CC) which lead to the promulgation of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 5 of 2015.
30 2016 2 SACR 540 (CC).
31 See further Jephson and Mngomezulu “Constitutional Litigation Procedure”
in J Brickhill (ed) Public Interest Litigation in South Africa Juta 2018 147 et
seq.
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a recent example concerns the settlement between the Centre and the
MEC for Social Development, Gauteng, MEC for Health Gauteng and MEC
for Education, Gauteng32 relating to the absence of any services for
children with severe or profound disruptive behaviour disorders who
come into conflict with the law. This settlement saw the Departments
agreeing to the development of a properly costed and budgeted
intersectoral policy and implementation plan to ensure, amongst others,
that appropriate prevention and early intervention plans are
implemented to cater for children at risk of developing severe or
profound disruptive behaviour disorders, within their families and
communities as far as possible; and that an appropriate spread of
residential programmes and mental health care services specifically
geared towards catering for children with severe or profound disruptive
behaviour disorders be developed and provided. 
Not unexpectedly, Skelton reflects on the key relationship between s
28(2) enshrining the paramountcy of the best interests of the child
principle, and other constitutional rights. As a self-standing right and a
guiding principle,33 it has been drawn into a variety of cases she cites
concerning the right to parental or family care, international child
abduction, child pornography, the right to housing, adoption, customary
inheritance law, health care, the right to social assistance, child’s right to
privacy and dignity, the testimony of child victims and witnesses, the
right of children removed from their families to have that removal
reviewed by a court, the right of children not to be prosecuted for
consensual sexual activity, the right of child sex offenders not to be
automatically placed on the sex offenders register, and the rights of
children in conflict with the law not to be detained except as a measure
of last resort.34 
She concludes that the case law referred to “demonstrates a real
commitment by the courts towards interpreting and applying these
paper rights to the real-life situation of children. The approach to children
in litigation encompasses both the need to protect children and advance
their [autonomy] rights.”35
An even more upbeat assessment is provided by her in the recent
publication on “Public Interest litigation in South Africa”.36 Using as a
leitmotif the food metaphor inherent in the claim that children’s rights
32 Case 77362/16 Gauteng Provincial Division Pretoria.
33 Although, as courts have pointed out, this does not mean that s 28(2) is not
itself capable of limitation: see for a fuller discussion S v M (Centre for Child
Law as Amicus Curiae) par 25 and 26 and Centre for Child Law v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 SA SACR 477 (CC).
34 Skelton “Chapter 11: Constitutional protection of Children’s Rights”
346- 347.
35 Skelton supra 358.
36 Skelton “Children’s Rights” in J Brickhill (ed) Public Interest Litigation in
South Africa Juta 2018 at 258.
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were “chicken soup”,37 she asserts that “the South African courts’
treatment of children’s rights has been far more piquant than the bland
potage that was apparently expected”.38 
In this chapter, she engages in a cook’s tour of significant cases in
more or less chronological order, starting with Williams39 in the
interregnum during which the interim constitution held force, and
proceeding to the landmark judgment in TAC40 in 2002, before
describing the effervescence of children’s rights litigation that began to
occur around 2007. She accords a prominent space to S v M, and its
elegant rendition of the “constitutionally imagined child”. This case she
describes as the “post constitutional locus classicus on the best interests
principle”.41 
In the criminal law sphere, she contends that the courts have been
unwavering in their recognition that children are different from adults,
and that their culpability is affected by their lack of maturity.42 She avers
that the CC has not failed to grasp the nettle in the context of difficult
cases involving sexual offences and the overreach of legislation.43 The
chapter reviews the then state of progress of litigation around the
constitutionality of the common law rule permitting parents to
reasonably chastise their children in YG v S,44 in which a CC ruling is
awaited. 
In conclusion, the chapter alludes to the overall disappointing results
in expounding children’s access to socio-economic rights, though the
concessions as regards the duties of the state to fulfil these when children
are without parental care or are removed from the family environment
are acknowledged.45 It predicts future litigation in the area of migrant
children’s rights, as well as relating to birth registration and stateless
children. Tellingly, the chapter speaks to the high level of strategic and
deliberate intention behind the children’s litigation of the last decade,
including in relation to cases that were brought to court, as well as to
those that were not.
37 Sloth-Nielsen “Chicken Soup or Chain Saws: Some implications of the
constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South Africa” 1996 Acta Juridica
6, based on a throwaway remark made by erstwhile opposition leader Tony
Leon at the time that children’s rights were debated in the Constitutional
Assembly.
38 Skelton “Children’s Rights” 258.
39 S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) in which juvenile whipping as a sentence
was ruled unconstitutional.
40 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 6 SA 121 (CC).
41 Skelton “Children’s Rights” 269.
42 Skelton “Children’s Rights” 271.
43 Teddy Bear Clinic v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, supra,
and J v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 2014 (2) SACR 1
(CC).
44 2018 1 SACR 64 (GJ).
45 Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T). 
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4 The education terrain
The education terrain presents an obvious site for contestation about
children’s rights. In previous work, reference was made to Juma Musjid46
(confirming that the right to education is immediately enforceable and
not subject to progressive realisation) and Western Cape Forum for
Intellectual Disability,47 but a veritable flood of litigation has been
brought since then to attempt to raise education standards and to
improve service delivery. This frontier has been attacked by Equal
Education, Section 27, Lawyers for Human Rights, the Centre for Child
Law, and the Legal Resources Centre.48 The well known “mud schools”
cases represented the first real foray in the endeavour to compel the
Eastern Cape provincial government to provide facilities conducive to
teaching and learning and resulted in a settlement with government
committing to addressing the infrastructure backlog.49 As Kamga notes,
the “courts have been unambiguous in holding that education cannot be
considered available if learners are not provided with textbooks”.50 The
Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed that the Constitution entitles
every learner at a public school to be provided with a textbook prescribed
for his or her grade before commencement of teaching for the course for
which that textbook is prescribed.51 The duty to fulfil this right rests on
the State. 
Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education52 dealt with desks and chairs
for reading and writing, also as part of the immediately realisable right to
basic education; post provisioning for both teaching and non-teaching
staff was the subject matter of Centre for Child Law v Minister for Basic
Education;53 physical accessibility of schools through the provision of
free transport where learners could not otherwise access their schools
has been addressed;54 and in the Linkside cases discussed by Kamga,55
the court ordered that the affected schools be refunded for teacher costs
they had had to bear themselves, and that the educators concerned be
properly appointed. According to Kamga, this was South Africa’s first
46 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761
(CC). This was the first time that the Constitutional Court directly
considered the content of the right to education.
47 Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of
South Africa 2011 5 SA 87 (WCC).
48 See MacConachie and Breener “Litigating the Right to Basic Education” in J
Brickhill (ed) Public Interest Litigation in South Africa Juta 2018.
49 Kamga “The right to a basic education” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South
Africa 526.
50 Kamga “The right to a basic education” 527.
51 Section 27 v Minister for Education 2016 4 SA 63 (SCA). 
52 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM).
53 2013 3 SA 183 (ECG)
54 See the cases discussed by Kamga “The right to a basic education” 531-
532.
55 Linkside v Minister of Basic Education 2014 ZAECGHC 111; Linkside v
Minister of Basic Education 2015 ZAECGHC 36; Kamga “The right to a basic
education” 530.
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“opt in” class action, with approximately 80 schools “opting in” as
applicants.
McConnachie and Breener note that the school infrastructure (and
textbook) cases were accompanied by “an extensive mobilisation
campaign”.56 This included community activism, You Tube videos,
camping outside the High Court during hearings, engaging print media,
and the organisation of mass marches. They ascribe the eventual
adoption of the Norms and Standards for Public School Infrastructure
which detail the requirements for water and sanitation, electricity, safe
classrooms accommodating a maximum of 40 learners, and eventually,
internet connectivity, libraries, laboratories and sports facilities, as
illustrative of the combined power of social movements coupled with
legal intervention.57 It is important to reflect that the Norms and
Standards were released only after successful further litigation to compel
the Minister to produce these.58
The most recent judgments on the Norms and Standards bear noting:
in Equal Education v Minister of Basic Education, AJ Mziza noted that the
parties agreed that the right to education was of the “highest order” of
socio economic rights. The application sought to declare unconstitutional
those subparts of the Regulations that subjected the implementation of
the Norms and Standards to available resources and to the co-operation
from other government agencies and entities responsible for
infrastructure in general, and their making available such
infrastructure.59 The basis for this claim of unconstitutionality was that it
gives Government a means of escaping the obligation to provide
adequate school infrastructure due to the “clawback” provisions. 
“As I understand the argument put forward by the Minister, her hands are
tied. To me, this means that she is at the mercy of the other departments and
organs of State. This simply compromises the constitutional value of
accountability. There is no way that the Government can be held accountable
for the discharge of its duty to provide basic basic school infrastructure.
Therefore, because the provision of basic infrastructure is indisputably an
integral component of the right to basic education, it means Government
cannot be held to account ...”60
The prioritisation in the Norms of eliminating schools built “entirely”
(rather than partly) of hazardous materials or which were unsafe was,
moreover, found to be irrational: an unsafe structure poses the same risk
to learners and teachers whether there are also some safe structures at
the school. 61 And school infrastructure already planned for could not be
56 McConnachie and Breener “Litigating the Right to Basic Education” 289
and 292.
57 McConnachie and Breener “Litigating the Right to Basic Education” 290.
58 Equal Education v Minister of Basic Education 2018 9 BCLR 1130 (ECB) par
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excluded from the Norms altogether on any rational basis, as they would
then remain outside of the purview of the Norms indefinitely. The
Minister’s claim that she was hamstrung to allocate resources for
infrastructure should have been justified in terms of the Constitution,
which was not done.62 In what may be a high water mark in this
particular litigation trajectory, the CC dismissed the Minister’s application
for leave to appeal – it bore no prospects of success. 
Considering that children spend at least 9 years of their lives – half
their childhood – in school, it is not unexpected that school governance
has been a challenging arena, especially given the context of past
discrimination and inequality in the school system. The powers of school
governing bodies have been the subject of not inconsiderable
contestation, and the distribution of power between parents, the
executive, learners and educators has reached the CC on a number of
occasions.63 School feeder zones, which entrench spatial inequality, and
language policy have been core themes. Religion and schooling has also
been a notable topic, not limited to the corporal punishment issue in the
Christian schools case, or to apparel and insignia.64
5 Some key features of 20 years of child rights 
jurisprudence in South Africa
5 1 Reach and scope
My previous articles have highlighted the broad church of issues that
have been brought to the attention of courts in which children’s rights
have surfaced. As was held in S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus
Curiae), the language of s 28 of the Constitution is “comprehensive and
emphatic” and it has indeed come to pass that “statutes must be
interpreted and the common law developed in a manner which favours
protecting and advancing the interests of children”.65 This has continued
to occur, in fields as diverse as striking down provisions which enshrined
61 Par 192.
62 Par 195.
63 McConnachie and Breener “Litigating the Right to Basic Education” 286-7.
See in particular Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State
Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 CC, MEC for Education
Gauteng Province and others v Rivonia Primary school and others 2013
ZACC 34, and Federation of Governing Bodies for South African Schools v
MEC for Education, Gauteng and Another 2016 ZACC 14.
64 See Kruger and McConnachie “The impact of the Constitution on learners
rights” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa Juta, discussing inter alia
Organisasie Vir Godsdienste-Onderrig en Demokrasie v Laerskool Randhart
2017 3 All SA 943 (GJ) in which it was ruled that it was “unlawful for a
school to promote or allow its staff to promote that it, as a public school,
adheres to only one or predominantly one religion to the exclusion of
others.” 
65 Par 15.
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the prescription of sexual offences committed against children,66
upholding the genetic link requirement for confirmation of a valid
surrogacy agreement on children’s rights grounds (on behalf of yet-to-
be-born children),67 and confirming the hopelessness of an appeal to
overturn the schools Norms and Standards judgment. As has been noted,
children’s rights litigation has become socially accepted and legitimated
– it is no longer necessary to first argue the virtues of children’s rights, or
claim them on a basis of good morals: their legal function is now “self
executing”. They demand accountability on the part of the state. 
South African children’s rights jurisprudence is consequently arguably
the most far reaching currently in the world in having expanded the locus
of its application far beyond the family law terrain. Indeed, this
retrospective has for the most part eschewed discussing all the many
family law cases that have been reported, in favour of focussing on those
with a public law dimension. 
5 2 Judicial and litigator familiarity with children’s rights
In the 2008 article, an allusion was made to the specialised children’s
rights knowledge of some of the key judges, emanating from the pre-
democracy era. It was averred that they had (at times mero motu) flagged
children’s rights issues where these had not been argued by counsel. 20
years into democracy, I would argue that that conclusion continues to
bear relevance, despite the fact that scores of newer judges now populate
the bench. YG, penned by Judge Raylene Keightley,68 provides no better
example; also, the judgment in the High Court of Judge Joseph Raulinga
(formerly of the National Children’s Rights Committee) in Media 24 v
National Prosecuting Authority69 concerning the expansive measures put
in place (in a criminal trial of extreme public interest in which one
accused was a minor) to balance open access to justice with the right to
privacy of the child defendant is worthy of note. Furthermore, the case
that ended as Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Development and Others70 emanated from Judge
Eberhard Bertelsman’s decision in the High Court when he raised
constitutional questions pertaining to child victims and witnesses - he has
long been an aficionado of the children’s rights community. Ballast can
also be sought in the fact that at least in the Gauteng divisions, judges
alert children’s rights litigators to cases where a child rights issue may be
at stake, and invite them to enter as amicus. An example is in the string
of surrogacy cases that have been litigated in these courts,71 the
66 Levenstein v Estate Late Sidney Frankel 2018 ZACC 16, although the case was
won on behalf of all victims (adults as well).
67 AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 BCLR 267 (CC).
68 Keightley Children Rights Juta was edited by her in 1996 in her position as a
former academic.
69 2011 2 SACR 321 (GNP).
70 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC).
71 Sloth-Nielsen “Surrogacy in South Africa” in Scherpe, Fenton Glyn and Kaan
(eds) Surrogacy around the World Cambridge University Press, 2019 185.
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invitation to act in the swopped babies and customary adoption case,72
and indeed in YG itself.
Added to this is the fact that there is now a generation of litigators now
schooled in and comfortable with 20 years of children’s rights litigation,
unafraid to raise these arguments when they may advance children’s
rights. This stands in quite stark contrast to the period after Grootboom in
2000, when some litigators feared that the CC’s reference to children
being “loved for who they are”, and “not being stepping stones to
resources”, weighed against using children’s rights arguments, especially
if women’s rights claims stood a chance.73
5 3 Protection and autonomy 
Recognition of children’s evolving maturity warranting their need for
protection and simultaneous awareness of their autonomy has been a
key theme identified in the construction of the “constitutional child”. This
has been identified in relation to cases already mentioned, such as Centre
for Child Law v Minister of Justice (on life imprisonment as a sentence for
children)74 and S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) .
But the pendulum does sometimes swing between these policy values,
illustrating that they embody as much tension as they do coherence.75
Two examples support this point.
It has been alleged that Teddy Bear Clinic is an extraordinary
judgment,76 recognising as supreme children’s right to privacy and to
dignity, which triumph over conservative moral judgments enforced
through the blunt instrument of criminal law. 
72 Case no 32053/2014 Gauteng Division Pretoria. The cases concerned two
children swapped at birth, and who were thereafter raised by families who
were not biologically related to them. This was discovered only when
paternity tests were performed as an adjunct to a later application for child
maintenance when one ot the family’s relationship ended, 
73 See the mutedness of the children’s rights argument in TAC v Minister of
Health and Others. The author was at the time attached to the Community
Law Centre (now Dullah Omar Institute) prepared the amicus briefs for this
case, and was appraised of the decision to avoid children’s rights
arguments in the papers (even though the subject, the availability of anti-
retrovirals to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV, concerned
babies).
74 2009 6 SA 632 (CC).
75 See the argument by Skelton (“Balancing autonomy and protection in
children’s rights: a South African account” 2016 Temple Law Review 887) as
to why litigators opted not to use neuroscience research on the (delayed)
development of adolescent brain in Teddy Bear Clinic, as overly
protectionist. This position might have undermined the arguments
privileging sexual autonomy and freedom of choice of those same
adolescents.
76 Witting “Regulating bodies: the moral panic of child sexuality in the digital
era” 2019 Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law (forthcoming).
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The CC held that giving expression to our sexuality is at the core of the
area of private intimacy: if in expressing our sexuality we act
consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that space
constitutes breach of privacy.77 This applies in equal force to consensual
sexual conduct of adolescents (and this breach was exacerbated by the
mandatory reporting requirements). Striking down as unconstitutional
the offending criminal provisions which penalised consensual teenage
sexual intimacy, the CC gave primacy to the autonomy side of the scale.
But protectionism has held sway in other cases. In Du Toit v Ntshinghila
and others78 the need to protect the reasonable privacy interests of the
children who are depicted in pornographic images, the significant public
interest in ensuring that no duplication or distribution of images of child
pornography occurs in the disclosure process, and the prevention of
sexual exploitation of children, were all adduced to resist a claim that an
accused be given copies of child pornography images prior to
prosecution.
But Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Ltd79 reveals further dimensions of
the tension alluded to above. The case was portrayed in public as a
victory for children’s rights.80 To the extent that the cross appeal was
partially successful, and the SCA declared that the provisions of s 154 (3)
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were constitutionally invalid to
the extent that they did not protect the anonymity of child victims of
crimes who did not testify at criminal proceedings,81 this is true.
However, the greater portion of the judgment deals with what the bench
called “the adult extension”, namely whether the protection afforded
children regarding disclosure of their identities whilst under 18 would
extend into adulthood. According to the appellants, an interpretation that
ensured ongoing protection, better promoted section 28(2) and
protected child victims, witnesses, accused and offenders from the
severe harm of identification.82 The respondents denied that there was
any legal basis for the so-called “principle of ongoing protection”. 
The SCA was of the view that “[i]t is clear that the adult extension
severely restricts the right of the media to impart information and
infringes the open justice principle. In the absence of any legislation on
77 Teddy Bear Clinic par 59 and 60.
78 2016 2 All SA 328 (SCA)
79 2018 ZASCA 140. At the time of writing, the case has been appealed to the
Constitutional Court. Judgment is awaited.
80 By a spokesperson for the Centre for Child Law on national television. 
81 The existing section afforded protection to child accused and child
witnesses below the age of 18 years, but not to child victims who did not
testify. The case was occasioned by a prior application to protect the
identity of “Zoe Nurse”, kidnapped as a 2 day old baby and rediscovered
shortly before her 18th birthday by her biological parents. She did not
testify at the criminal trial of the woman who raised her. Once she turned
18, the media threatened to reveal her identity to the public in the
sensational and tragic case. 
82 Par 10.
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the nature and extent of the adult extension, the relief sought by the
appellants is overbroad and does not strike an appropriate balance
between the rights and interests involved.” Accordingly, the proposed
limitation asked for by the appellants on the right of the media to impart
information was neither reasonable nor justifiable, in terms of s 36 of the
Constitution.83
In a minority judgment, the opposite was argued: that 
“At first blush, it may seem that the difference between Swain JA and me is
finely calibrated. Regrettably, we are separated by a philosophical ocean. In
my opinion, when it comes to the disclosure of the identity of childhood
victims of crime, logic, common sense and ordinary, everyday morality
generate a constitutional imperative. It is that the relevant time, which is
determinative of the issue, is the time that the person was a child and not the
time from which the child has become an adult. In my opinion it is obvious
that if, in balancing the competing interests at stake in this matter, the
fulcrum is the question of onus, the scales must tilt in favour of those who
have become adults but were the victims of crime at a time when they were
children.”84
In a carefully crafted judgment, Willis JA for the minority held that “[a]
default position in law that allows for a retrospective intrusion into a
person’s victimhood of crime as a child would, in my opinion, violate that
person’s constitutional right to dignity. The knowledge, as a child, that
one’s identity as a victim of crime may be revealed upon the attaining of
one’s majority, may haunt that child, causing her considerable emotional
stress. In my opinion, it verges on cruelty to sanction torment such as
this.”85
The minority therefore held that the preservation of the anonymity of
the child should be the default position absent consent to reveal the
identity subsequent to reaching the age of 18 years. This door is not yet
closed, as the matter has been appealed to the CC, which has previously
granted extended life-long protection to child victims’ identities (in a case
involving a claim for delictual damages).86 
My assessment, therefore, does not discount that there may thus be
deep differences regarding the substance and normative requirements of
a child rights approach that will continue to prevail in some areas:




86 “This is in the best interests of the child, not merely in light of the child’s
right to privacy, but because when the child ‘becomes an adult the many
physical disabilities suffered by the [child] will result in vulnerability. If the
sums of money at the [child’s] disposal as a result of this [judgment] are
readily to be found out on the internet, there will be a risk of the [child]
losing that money to inappropriate friends, fortune hunters or even
thieves.’” MEC, Health and Social Development, Gauteng v DZ 2017 ZACC 37
at fn 1.
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judgments have been written. C v Minister of Health and Welfare
Gauteng,87 concerning whether the failure of the Children’s Act to
provide for an automatic judicial review of a removal of children effected
without a warrant was constitutional, produced two substantial minority
judgments; the SCA judgment in the Media 24 case is also emblematic of
this, as the quoted excerpt shows. AB v Minister of Social Development
(concerning the genetic link requirement for surrogacy) gave birth to
such a lengthy minority judgement that it could have been mistaken for
a majority judgment: obviously, the differences touched a deep core
amongst the Justices. Who can predict how YG and the common law
defence of reasonable chastisement will fare in the CC? 
The potential divergence between protection of children and giving
effect to their autonomy is impossible to dissect or expand any further,
in the absence of concrete and real life situations in which to situate such
a debate. But in a cautionary vein, the lesson of Le Roux v Dey88 (holding
schoolboys liable in delict for defamatory material circulated about their
deputy headmaster)89 shows that, sometimes, recognising children as
autonomous rights bearers can cause claimants to “fall on their
sword”.90 
5 4 Innovative remedies
A selection of the array of remedies that have been brought about in
children’s rights constitutional litigation has already been alluded to:
striking down legislation, reading in, structural interdicts, intervention in
procurement disputes to mitigate the impact on children’s rights,91 and
damages have all been the outcome of litigation. The litigation around
schools provisioning has undoubtedly seen some of the most inventive
remedies being devised. McConnachie and Breener ascribe this to the
non-compliance of Departments with prior orders or settlements,
prompting applicants to return to court to restructure relief.92 This even
extended to taking measures to attach the motor vehicle of the Minister
in order to satisfy the debt for teacher’s salaries! And unprecedented was
the relief to learners in Limpopo whose textbooks had not materialised,
rendering them unable to cover the school curriculum effectively: the
87 2012 ZACC 1.
88 2011 6 BCLR 577 (CC).
89 They superimposed the heads of their two teachers on the picture of two
men depicted in a sexually suggestive position.
90 I make this claim even though the majority decision did not consider
children’s rights. Most discussions of the case privilege discussions of the
minority judgments which do traverse children’s rights: see Kruger and
McConnachie “The impact of the Constitution on learners rights” 560-561
and Couzens “Le Roux v Dey and a children’s rights approach to judging”
2018 PER 1. 
91 Proudlock “Children’s socio-economic rights” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in
South Africa gives an overview of the relevant cases.
92 McConnachie and Breener 299.
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Department was ordered to draft and implement an extensive “catch up”
plan to remedy the damage done.93 
Whilst in South African jurisprudence, the terrain of child law is not
alone in innovating remedies, the range of remedies and results cited by
the authors reviewed does seem to set a rather high bar for other
jurisdictions to follow. 
5 5 The spade work of “best interests” and “dignity”
“Best interests” as a constitutional right, rule of procedure, and a
principle have been fairly exhaustively analysed thus far.94 As Gallinetti
has previously noted,95 the approach of the Court “underscores the need
to mainstream the best interests principle in all legal arenas where
children are involved even where established legal rules or principles
have never given regard thereto previously”. According to S v M (Centre
for Child Law as Amicus Curiae), best interests requires first, consideration
of the interests of children; second, the retention in the inquiry of any
competing interests;, third, the apportionment of appropriate weight to
the interests of the child;96 and fourth, overall, the rights and interests of
children must be considered independently of those of their primary
care-giver. Section 28(2) mandates courts in particular to play a very
active role in raising and securing children’s best interests.97 Where
parents or legal representatives do not defend children’s best interests,
courts must ex officio come forward to do so. The need for a best interest
inquiry also presupposes that courts have sufficient information at their
disposal to understand the impact of their decision upon children. 
Inflexible policies98 may fall foul of section 28(2) because they do not
cater to the individualised approach required. “Best interests” safeguards
children’s rights against arguments based purely on legal technicalities
which do not take into account their individual circumstances.99 “Best
interests” has been held to underpin the need for a remedy even where,
technically, no violation or breach has been found, as in the requirement
that the school review its policy on pregnant learners in the Welkom
schools case.100 And the “nude” best interests principle contained in
93 McConnachie and Breener 300.
94 Bonthuys “The best interests of children in the South African Constitution”
2006 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23.
95 Gallinetti “2kul2Btru: What children would say about the jurisprudence of
Albie Sachs” 2010 SAPL 2010 108 at 115.
96 Par 22, 26 and 32.
97 See too Van den Burgh discussed in South-Nielsen and Kruuse.
98 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom
High School [2013] JOL 30547 (CC).
99 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur “Illicit Transfer by De Gree” 2007 Law,
Democracy and Development 1.
100 Couzens “The South African Constitutional Court and the Best interests of
the Child” in Diduck, Peleg and Reece (eds) Law in Society: Reflections on
Children, Culture, Family and Society Brill 2015 534. At 535 she notes: “Thus
section 28(2) justified the crafting of a remedy in somewhat unusual
  Children’s rights jurisprudence in South Africa – a 20 year retrospective   517
section 28(2) was used to fashion a solution to order de facto101
adoptions in the “baby swap” cases – even in a situation where adoption
was not part of the common law (and could therefore not be developed),
nor did the provisions of the Children’s Act have any bearing because
both babies (now children) were not orphaned or abandoned or in need
of permanent alternative care, and were therefor ineligible for statutory
adoption. 
Finally, although the courts have repeatedly stated that “best interest”
is not a trump over all rights, it remains a right which is accorded a
degree of privilege in the balancing of rights.102 
It can be concluded – as Couzens103 has done – that “best interests”
is hardly an empty vessel any longer, into which the whims of the
decision maker can be poured, with indeterminate outcomes, an
uncertain reach and an unpredictable result. It has indeed served as a
“multifunctional tool”.104 That there is plenty of scope for further clarity
on the normative content of this right in specific situations seems
obvious: the next twenty years of children’s rights constitutional
litigation will tell. 
Dignity has continued to form the bedrock of many judicial
pronouncements on children. Thus in De Reuck, it was said that 
“[c]hildren’s dignity rights are of special importance. The degradation of
children through child pornography is a serious harm which impairs their
dignity and contributes to a culture which devalues their worth. Society has
recognised that childhood is a special stage in life which is to be both
treasured and guarded.”105 
And in YG, Judge Keightley reiterated that “[u]nder the Constitution the
child enjoys the general right to dignity under section 10. In addition,
children enjoy special protection under section 28(1)(d) to be protected
from, among other things, degradation. Human dignity lies at the heart
of this latter protection. In turn, the right to dignity is foundational to our
100 circumstances, when a human rights violation has not been fully
established. Such a drastic remedy was nonetheless necessary because of
the serious impact of children of the school policies. The remedy was
envisaged to have a pre-emptive effect- rather than an ex post facto
remedial impact.”
101 Case no 32053/2014 Gauteng Division Pretoria. See further note 74 above.
102 Couzens note 102 538.
103 Couzens note 102 538. “Section 28(2) has been used by the Court to create
obligations which make the law more responsive to children’s needs as
rights holders …. It is perhaps symbolic that the Court rather than
grounding this jurisprudence in the right to equal protection of the law
(section 9(1) of the Constitution) or the right to an appropriate remedy
(section 38 of the Constitution), the Court often relied on section 28(2). It
seems that for the Court this section is quintessential for giving children the
legal protection which is due to them.” 
104 Couzens note 102 545.
105 Par 63.
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constitutional dispensation.”106 Noting that dignity plays a twofold role
in the consideration of the constitutionality of the defence of reasonable
chastisement,107 she explains that whereas adults who are victims of
assault enjoy the protection of the law to vindicate their rights, the child,
by virtue of the potential of the reasonable chastisement defence to block
such vindication, is “treated with a lesser level of concern”108 and the
state is given less power to protect his or her rights. The effect is to deny
the child’s independent right to dignity and to subsume his or her dignity
interests under that of his or her parents – in direct contrast to S v M.109
In 2013, Kruuse and I wrote of dignity as follows:
“we contend that the elaboration of a children’s right to dignity holds
considerable promise as a tool for future legal interpretation. In our view, it
provides a more concrete and authoritative (sophisticated) basis for
adjudicating the complex interplay of competing rights where children are
concerned by comparison to the more simplistic and a-contextual so-called
‘balancing’ of rights that courts allude to practicing.”110
Has this promise been true? At this stage, I do not believe that many
noteworthy advances have been made in support of that contention.
Dignity, generally, has surfaced rather tangentially, for instance in
relation to core principles of privacy and autonomy in the Teddy Bear
Clinic case, rather than as a standalone embodiment of children’s rights
as human beings. Its contours, how it can assist to resolve tensions
between competing interests, and to which fields of inquiry children’s
dignity must be brought in, remain rather opaque. Therefore, unless the
CC develops a more focussed understanding of children’s dignity (within
a rights based approach) – as it may well yet do in YG – dignity remains
rather subordinate to “best interests” as a tool for developing our
conception of constitutional children’s rights.
5 6 Engagement with international law
Quite a few commentators have previously embarked on the study of the
court’s use of international and regional law in bolstering its
jurisprudence.111 Meda Couzens’ as yet unpublished work is particularly
interesting; it seeks to describe how the CC and the SCA have engaged
106 Par 71.




110 Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse 669.
111 See my own publications of 2008 and 2013, as well as Skelton “The
development of a fledgling child rights jurisprudence in Eastern and
Southern Africa based on international and regional instruments” 2009
AHRLJ 482; Ngidi “'The role of international law in the development of
children’s rights in South Africa: A children’s rights litigator’s perspective' in
Killander (ed) International law and domestic human rights litigation in Africa
(PULP, 2010) 173; Skelton “Child Justice in South Africa: Application of
International Instruments in the Constitutional Court” 2018 IJCR 391.
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with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in an attempt to
uncover its “jurisprudential value added” (alongside the provisions of
section 28 of the Constitution itself). She notes that as at December 2017,
there had been 16 cases in each of these courts in which the CRC was
referred to or relied upon. She suggests that 
“The courts have been receptive to the CRC, a receptiveness which extends to
soft-law instruments, such as general comments of the CRC and other UN
documents. While the courts do not always give close attention to the
standards of the CRC or sometimes plainly ignore it, apart from Jafta J's
rejection of the CRC in C v Department of Health on grounds that it was not
incorporated domestically, the legitimacy of references to the CRC has not
been contested. As a consequence, there is little judicial preoccupation with
the domestic legal status of the CRC. Whether this indicates an unconditional
embracing of the CRC is a matter of some uncertainty, as the CRC has
generally been invoked to obtain outcomes also supported by the
Constitution, and the state has not opposed its application by courts.” 112
She affirms that “the use of the CRC as a reference framework can be
found in those cases where courts make statements as to the
compatibility between domestic standards and the CRC”113 which
strengthen the weight and legitimacy of the constitutional norm at stake.
There are also cases she discusses (some of which I have discussed in this
article) in which reliance is placed on the CRC as a guide to judicial
discretion. This involves courts using the CRC as an aid in making a
choice between legitimate solutions, with children’s rights weighing in
the balancing act. 
She also refers to the “less tangible influences” of the CRC (seen in
combination with the Constitution), including by “changing hearts and
minds over time”.114 She opines that these strengthen the legitimacy of
the CRC as a habitual presence in the judicial discourse. These remarks
apply, with the changes required by the context, to constitutional
children’s rights.
6 Conclusion
It is tempting to be rather self-congratulatory about the ongoing
constitutional enterprise to advance children’s rights. This reflective
overview indicates that the past twenty years have yielded a rich and
remarkably interesting array of cases – and that more are yet to come.
Although I do not believe that I have raised any particularly new or
surprising insights that have not already been said before, final
comments on the significance of the constitutional children’s rights
journey are apposite. 
112 Couzens “The application of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child by national courts” LLD thesis University of Leiden, 2019 175.
113 Couzens 179.
114 Quoting Sloth-Nielsen 2001.
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First, constitutionalising children’s rights has the advantage of
elevating their status to the highest point in a legal system. This brings
the twin advantages of entrenchment (making them harder to erode) and
supremacy (making it possible to enforce children’s rights in the face of
conflicting lower laws and policies).115 As O’Mahony noted,116 this effect
can be magnified when the best interests principle is constitutionalised
and can ensure that court cases are framed in a child-centred manner
rather than be dominated by the constitutional rights of adults. 
Second, Federle speaks of rights having the capacity to shift the
balance of power.117 
“An understanding of power is central to any effort to reconstruct rights for
children ... Because of the nature and fluidity of power, it structures and
shapes our personal interactions and relationships in ways that permit us to
assert dominance or engage in submissiveness. But political, legal and social
frameworks limit the ways in which individuals may negotiate for or assert
power; whilst such limitations provide some certainty and stability in our
interactions, they also create opportunities for the accretion of power and the
subordination of other interests ... . Rights claims command the respect of
others in our society and demand that one be taken seriously, whilst
recognising the claimant’s independent value as a human being. For children,
rights talk does have a place in their lives by offering an alternative approach
to paternalistic practices.”118
This, I believe, is the central lesson that 20 years of constitutional
children’s rights litigation has taught: that the paternalism so
characteristic of the welfarist approaches that used to occupy centre
stage in the law’s construction of children has been pushed aside in the




117 Federle “Do Rights Still Flow Downhill?” 2017 IJCR 273.
118 Federle 281-2.
